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Rohingya Night Watch System in Cox’s Bazar Camps Turns into Business Model, Residents Allege Exploitation and Security Failures

By Ahmmed Al Arakan·
Rohingya Night Watch System in Cox’s Bazar Camps Turns into Business Model, Residents Allege Exploitation and Security Failures
Rohingya public protesting to stop night watch system (Night Pahara) in Kutupalong Campong camp

Key Takeaway

Night watch system in Cox’s Bazar Rohingya camps, started 2021-22 for security, has become a business for Majhis. Poor families do duty 4 times monthly or pay 300+ taka/night; others pay 9,000 taka yearly. Watchmen often guard leaders and checkpoints, not blocks. Crimes persist. Rohingya Monitor urges stronger official patrols.

COX’S BAZAR — A night watch system introduced in the Rohingya refugee camps of Cox’s Bazar between late 2021 and early 2022 to address rising insecurity has increasingly become a source of financial burden and frustration for ordinary residents, according to community observations and a recent protest video by Rohingya people after two watchmen were injured in gun attacks in Kutupalong.

The system, known locally as “pahara” or night patrolling, was launched in response to frequent house burnings at night, theft, dacoity, armed clashes and other security threats. Initially organised in a more structured manner, it required Rohingya men to take turns guarding their blocks. Over time, however, residents say it has shifted into a business model that primarily benefits Block Majhis (who oversee roughly 100 families), Head Majhis (responsible for several blocks) and camp Chairmen.

Under the current arrangement, members of poorer families are typically required to perform night watch duty at least four times a month — once a week. Those unable to attend must pay more than 300 taka for each missed night. Families with greater means, or those who fear the risks of night duty, often settle the obligation by paying around 9,000 taka per year directly to the Block Majhi. These annual payments are reportedly distributed among Block Majhis, Head Majhis and, in some cases, certain official security personnel according to Majhis.

As more households opt to pay rather than serve, the number of people available for actual duty declines. Consequently, the remaining unpaid residents face an increased frequency of night shifts. Community monitors note that despite the formal existence of the system, watchmen are frequently absent from the blocks themselves. Instead, many are assigned to guard the residential areas of Head Majhis or to provide security at Armed Police Battalion (APBN) checkpoints.

Residents and observers argue that this practice undermines the original purpose of the system. Rather than jointly patrolling the camps to monitor gambling dens, armed elements, criminal hideouts and other high-risk zones, the watchmen’s efforts are directed toward protecting community leaders and fixed security posts. The result, they say, is continued high levels of insecurity. Crimes persist, and even adolescents aged around 16 to 18 have become involved in criminal activities, emboldened by the lack of consistent, visible patrols across residential areas.

A Rohingya community member, writing on 30 September 2026, highlighted similar concerns, describing how block guarding has turned into a commercial arrangement for some Majhis, with monthly and daily payment rates that place heavy pressure on ordinary families. The writer drew parallels to forced unpaid labour (*kuli*) imposed under previous authorities in Myanmar and stressed that refugees fled persecution — including killings, sexual violence and the burning of homes — only to face new forms of hardship in the densely packed camps of Bangladesh. The individual questioned how residents already struggling to live with their own families in limited space can be expected to guard entire blocks, and urged the Bangladesh government not to make the system permanent.

The Rohingya Monitor has closely observed criminal networks inside the camps and found that perpetrators remain highly sensitive to the presence of regular police, army or Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) forces. When information spreads of such deployments, criminals reportedly withdraw into hidden areas to avoid confrontation or arrest. Sustained, intelligence-led joint patrols involving Bangladesh security forces and APBN units would significantly reduce the space available for criminal activity.

Rohingya Monitor’s observations indicate that while the night watch system continues to operate on paper, its transformation into a payment-based arrangement has left many blocks poorly protected. Residents and monitors are calling on Bangladesh authorities to review the practice, ensure that any community-based security measures do not become vehicles for exploitation, and strengthen official security deployments — including army presence alongside APBN — with continuous, intelligence-driven patrolling across the camps.

Without such measures, community voices warn, ordinary refugees will continue to bear both the financial costs and the security risks of a system that no longer serves its intended purpose.

Tags:#Rohingya Refugee Camps#Corruption#Rohingya Crisis

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